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Patients with schizophrenia are often described as impaired in several cognitive
domains. Specifically, patients with schizophrenia often exhibit problems in solving tasks
requiring theory of mind (ToM), i.e., the ability to ascribe mental states to oneself and
others, communicative-pragmatic ability, i.e., the ability to use language and non-verbal
expressive means to convey meaning in a given context, and executive functions (EF).
This study aims to investigate the role of cognitive functions, such as general intelligence,
selective attention, processing speed, and especially EF (working memory, cognitive
flexibility, inhibition, and planning), and ToM in explaining the performance of individual
with schizophrenia in comprehending and producing communicative acts expressed
with different communicative intentions (i.e., sincere, deceitful, and ironic), and realized
through linguistic and extralinguistic/non-verbal expressive means. Thirty-two patients
with schizophrenia and an equal number of healthy controls performed tasks aiming
to investigate their capacity to comprehend and produce sincere, deceitful, and
ironic communicative acts in addition to a series of cognitive tasks evaluating EF
and ToM. The results indicated that individuals with schizophrenia performed worse
than the controls in the comprehension and production of all pragmatic phenomena
investigated, as well as in all the cognitive functions examined. The patients with
schizophrenia also exhibited an increasing trend of difficulty in comprehending and
producing sincere, deceitful, and ironic communicative acts expressed through either
linguistic or extralinguistic means. Furthermore, a multiple regression analysis of the
patients’ performance on the pragmatic tasks revealed that overall, the role of attention,
general intelligence, and processing speed did not appear to significantly explain
the patients’ communicative-pragmatic performance. The inclusion of EF into the
analysis did not contribute to increase the explained variance of the patients’ ability
to comprehend and produce the various pragmatic phenomena investigated. Only the
addition of ToM could significantly increase the explained variance, but only in the
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comprehension and production of deceit expressed by language and the production
of sincere communicative acts, also limited to linguistic production. We conclude that
neither EF nor ToM are able to explain the decreasing trend detected in the patients’
pragmatic performance.
Keywords: schizophrenic pathology, pragmatics, theory of mind, executive function, schizophrenia
INTRODUCTION
Since Frith’s (1992) theoretical proposal, numerous studies in the
literature have reported a theory of mind (ToM) impairment in
patients with schizophrenia (Abu-Akel, 1999; Sarfati and Hardy-
Baylé, 1999; Bosco et al., 2009; Bliksted et al., 2014; Csukly
et al., 2014; Bechi et al., 2018; Vaskinn et al., 2018), which is
a difficulty attributing mental states, such as intentions, desires
and beliefs, to themselves and others (Premack and Woodruff,
1978). Several reviews and meta-analyses have confirmed this
finding. For example, Harrington et al. (2005) conducted a
review of studies comparing persons with schizophrenia and
healthy controls performing ToM tasks, and the authors pointed
out that most previous researchers showed that individuals
with schizophrenia performed significantly worse than the
controls in at least one of the tasks investigated. Additionally, a
previous meta-analysis of Sprong et al. (2007) showed that the
performance of patients with schizophrenia significantly differed
from the average performance of healthy controls; furthermore,
demographic variables, such as age, educational level and gender,
did not affect such results. Bora et al. (2009) conducted a more
controlled meta-analysis and reached a similar conclusion. Brune
(2005) reviewed previous studies investigating ToM deficits in
individuals with schizophrenia while considering the role of
general intelligence, i.e., IQ, and concluded that the ToM deficit
was not a consequence of general cognitive impairment. Further
studies have reported that after controlling for other cognitive
functions, such as general intelligence, attention and memory, the
differences in ToM tasks between individuals with schizophrenia
and healthy controls remained significant (see also Brüne and
Bodenstein, 2005; Mo et al., 2008; Bliksted et al., 2014).
However, other authors have argued that a deficit in
executive functions (EF) should be considered the core cognitive
impairment of the disease and that such deficits are primary
(Weickert et al., 2000; Reichenberg and Harvey, 2007). EF refer
to abilities, such as shifting to switch attention among multiple
tasks; updating to manipulate information in working memory
(WM); and inhibition to suppress pre-potent responses (Miyake
et al., 2000). This set of complex abilities is associated with
brain activity in the frontal lobe (Eisenberg and Berman, 2010).
These abilities allow a person to plan behavior flexibly and
effectively, make decisions in a sequential and hierarchical order,
and engage in goal-directed behavior flexibly, adapting behavior
to the specific context. Numerous studies have shown that all
EF mentioned above are severely impaired in schizophrenia
(for a review, see Reichenberg and Harvey, 2007: Orellana and
Slachevsky, 2013). Previous studies have evaluated the role of EF
in explaining ToM impairment in patients with schizophrenia
(for a review, see Bosco and Parola, 2017). Pickup (2008) analyzed
studies investigating both ToM and EF deficits in individuals with
schizophrenia; the author found that patients with schizophrenia
have deficits in mentalizing and other cognitive abilities and
revealed a strong correlation between these abilities. However, the
author also found that most studies, even after controlling for EF,
confirmed the residual presence of ToM deficits. Pickup (2008)
concluded that in patients with schizophrenia, ToM deficits do
not depend on executive functioning.
Impairment in communicative-pragmatic ability is another
well-documented impairment associated with schizophrenia
(Cummings, 2017; Bucca, 2018). Several studies have pointed
out that the performance of persons with schizophrenia
significantly differed from that of controls in the comprehension
of communicative acts that implied a gap between the literal
and communicative meaning, such as indirect speech acts
(Corcoran, 2003), irony (Langdon et al., 2002; Tavano et al.,
2008; Varga et al., 2018) and other forms of figurative language,
such as metaphors, idioms and proverbs (Schettino et al.,
2010; Haas et al., 2014; Moro et al., 2015). Patients with
schizophrenia also show difficulty in other pragmatic domains,
such as recognition and recovery of communicative failures
(Bosco et al., 2012), narrative production (Marini et al., 2008),
deceit (Frith and Corcoran, 1996), and scalar implicatures
(Wampers et al., 2018).
Typically, the studies in the literature have focused on
the ability of patients with schizophrenia to use language
(e.g., Linscott, 2005; Moro et al., 2015; Thanh et al., 2017;
Corcoran et al., 2018; Pauselli et al., 2018), while non-verbal,
extralinguistic and paralinguistic modalities have been generally
overlooked (see Cohen et al., 2014; Parola et al., 2018,
2019b). However, Colle et al. (2013) assessed the ability of
individuals with schizophrenia to comprehend and produce
different types of pragmatic phenomena, such as direct and
indirect communicative acts, deceit and irony, and investigated
extralinguistic and paralinguistic modalities in addition to
language. The results of the study pointed out that the
participants with schizophrenia performed significantly worse
than the healthy controls in all investigated tasks expressed in
both expressive modalities. By comparing some of the pragmatic
phenomena investigated, the authors detected a pattern of
increasing difficulty in the comprehension and production of
direct and indirect sincere communicative acts, which were the
easiest tasks to perform, followed by the comprehension and
production of deceit and irony, which were the most difficult
tasks to solve. The authors explained these results in terms
of the demands on the increasing inferential ability involved
in the various types of tasks. Inferences refer to the ability to
bridge the gap between what a speaker literally said and what
s/he wished to communicate, as in the case of indirect speech
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acts, irony and other forms of figurative language (see, for
example, Grice, 1975; Searle, 1979). Inferential abilities play a
crucial role in the pragmatic domain, i.e., the use of language
and other expressive means to convey a communicative meaning
(Levinson, 1983).
Colle et al. (2013) explained the increasing trend of difficulty
in the comprehension and production of sincere, ironic and
deceitful communicative acts on the basis of the Cognitive
Pragmatics theory (Airenti et al., 1993; Bara, 2010). According to
the theory, when two persons communicate, they act based on
a pattern of social knowledge shared between the interlocutors.
To comprehend the partner’s communicative intentions, a
communicative partner must recognize such a stereotyped
pattern of shared knowledge. Consider the following example:
“Imagine a person enters an office where a woman is waiting
and says [1] “It’s icy outside.” While the literal meaning of
the sentence is simple to be understood, the woman waiting
in the room could be disoriented. She would be able to draw
the appropriate inferences and answer appropriately only
if she comprehended that [1] meant, for example, to pay
attention to the icy ground outside or to close the window,
or whatever reason the utterance had been proffered” (Bara,
2010). Within this theoretical framework, it is possible to
analyze the inferential processes underlying the comprehension
and production of a communicative act uttered with different
communicative intentions: sincere, deceitful or ironic. In a
sincere communicative act, the speaker expresses knowledge
that is consistent with his/her private knowledge. In this
case, which is the standard in terms of the inferential process
involved, the partner simply has to refer to the interlocutor’s
utterance to the knowledge shared with him (see Bara, 2010).
In the case of non-standard communications, such as deceitful
and ironic communicative acts, more complex inferential
processes are involved. Specifically, as previously proposed,
“when a speaker utters a deceitful communicative act, her/his
intention contrasts with her/his private knowledge, but it
does not contrast with the knowledge s/he shares with the
partner” (Bosco et al., 2018a). In a deceitful communicative
act, the interlocutor “must handle the difference between
what is said and what the speaker privately knows” (Bosco
et al., 2018a). In the case of irony, the most difficult case
to deal with, among those we analyzed, as in the previous
case, the interlocutor’s communicative intention is in conflict
with her/his private knowledge; however, in this case, it is
also in contrast with the piece of knowledge s/he shares
with the partner (for a more detailed description see Bara,
2010). According to the theory, these assumptions hold both
for communicative acts expressed using both language and
extralinguistic means, for example, gestures (see Bara and
Tirassa, 1999) and hold both in cases of comprehension
and production of a communicative act. A similar trend of
increasing difficulty in the comprehension and production
of communicative acts proffered with the intention to be
sincere, ironic or deceitful has been detected in several
studies (Angeleri et al., 2008; Bosco and Bucciarelli, 2008;
Gabbatore et al., 2017). However, an alternative explanation
for this trend of increasing difficulty could be a primary
and increasing role of the EF and ToM involved in the
comprehension and production of the abovementioned
pragmatic phenomena.
Cognitive Function and Pragmatic
Deficits in Schizophrenia
Few empirical studies in the literature have systematically
explored the relationship between ToM and pragmatic ability in
schizophrenia; among these studies, Langdon et al. (2002) studied
the relationship between ToM and metaphor and irony. The
results indicated that individuals with schizophrenia achieved
lower scores than controls in both investigated pragmatic tasks.
Furthermore, the findings showed that patients’ scores on the
ToM items predicted their performance in the comprehension
of irony but not metaphors. Mazza et al. (2008) obtained a
similar pattern of results. These authors found that patients
were impaired in both ToM and irony comprehension, and a
correlation was observed between the performances on the two
associated tasks. However, Mo et al. (2008) reached different
conclusions. These authors used a story comprehension task
to investigate the comprehension of utterances proffered with
metaphorical and ironical intentions in addition to ToM tasks.
In line with previous studies, the findings revealed patient
impairments in all tasks investigated. However, in this case, the
results did not show a relationship between the performances in
the ToM and irony tasks. The patients’ abilities to comprehend
metaphors was also found to be associated with EF (Thoma et al.,
2009) and proverb comprehension (Sponheim et al., 2003).
Very few studies have investigated the role played by EF
and ToM in the pragmatic performance of patients with
schizophrenia to disentangle the specific effects of each specific
function. Champagne-Lavau and Stip (2010) examined the role
of ToM and EF, i.e., shifting, inhibitory control and cognitive
flexibility, in patients with schizophrenia in the comprehension of
different pragmatic phenomena, including indirect requests and
idiomatic and non-idiomatic metaphors. The results indicated
that the differences in the performances of the patient and control
groups on the pragmatic tasks persisted after ruling out the role
of EF. In contrast, after controlling for the role of ToM, the
differences persisted for the comprehension of non-idiomatic
metaphors but not for the comprehension of indirect speech
acts and idiomatic metaphors. In a more recent study, Bambini
et al. (2016) investigated the role of cognition, i.e., EF, including
WM, planning and processing speed, verbal memory and fluency,
IQ, ToM, and pragmatic ability, measured with the Assessment
of Pragmatic Abilities and Cognitive Substrates (APACS, Arcara
and Bambini, 2016) in a group of clinically stabilized patients
with schizophrenia. APACS is a battery that includes assessments
of both comprehension and production ability and investigates
pragmatic phenomena, such as narrative, ironic and figurative
language. The authors found that both cognition and ToM
affected patients’ performance in pragmatic comprehension, in
contrast to pragmatic production where the regression analysis
revealed a significant role only for cognition.
Given the importance of analyzing both the comprehension
and production ability and with the aim of extending the
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investigation to the extralinguistic expressive modality,
Parola et al. (2018) analyzed the role played by EF and ToM in
sustaining the communicative-pragmatic deficits observed in
the pragmatic ability of patients with schizophrenia. The results
indicated that after ruling out the role of EF, ToM could predict
the patients’ ability in both the comprehension and production
aspects of the linguistic tasks but not the extralinguistic
tasks, whereas EF did not have any explanatory role in any
of the investigated phenomena (linguistic or extralinguistic
comprehension and production).
Overall, the state of the evidence concerning the relationships
between cognitive functions and ToM and comprehension and
production of specific communicative acts in schizophrenia
is not completely clear. ToM appears to be the factor
more closely related to pragmatic difficulties of patients with
schizophrenia. However, the role of ToM has varied greatly across
different studies depending on the communicative phenomena
investigated (Langdon et al., 2002; Brüne and Bodenstein, 2005;
Mazza et al., 2008; Mo et al., 2008; Champagne-Lavau and
Stip, 2010; Bambini et al., 2016). In addition, previous studies
have investigated the comprehension and production of specific
communicative acts by assessing only linguistic expression,
while no previous studies have evaluated and compared
the recognition and production of different communicative
acts in different communicative modalities, i.e., verbal and
extralinguistic/non-verbal.
Present Study
The present study aims to investigate the role of cognitive
functions, i.e., general intelligence, selective attention, processing
speed, EF and ToM in explaining the ability of patients with
schizophrenia to comprehend and produce specific types
of pragmatic phenomena, i.e., sincere/literal, deceitful, and
ironic communicative acts, expressed through linguistic
and non-verbal/extralinguistic means. To the best of our
knowledge, this study is the first to investigate the specific
role that such cognitive functions play in explaining patients
with schizophrenia ability to comprehend and produce
communicative acts having different intentions (sincere,
deceitful, and ironic) while simultaneously considering both
linguistic and extralinguistic/non-verbal expressive means.
Consistent with Colle et al. (2013), we hypothesize a decreasing
level of patient performance among the investigated tasks in the
linguistic and extralinguistic/non-verbal expressive modalities,
and both in comprehension and in production, from the simplest
to the most difficult: sincere, deceitful, and ironic communicative
acts. Finally, we aim to investigate the role played by ToM
and EF play in explaining the decreasing trend in the level of
communicative performance.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
A group of 32 individuals with schizophrenia [7 women, 25
men; mean age = 40.17 years, standard deviation (SD) = 10.19;
mean education = 10.59 years, SD = 2.46] and 32 healthy
controls (7 women, 25 men; mean age = 40.28, SD = 11.16;
mean education = 10.50, SD = 2.46) participated in the study.
The experimental and control groups were matched by age,
education, and gender.
All patients fulfilled the DSM-IV criteria for the diagnosis
of schizophrenia (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). The
individuals with schizophrenia were chronically ill and clinically
stable (no hospitalization during the prior 6 months and no
changes in antipsychotic therapy during the prior 3 months). The
demographic and clinical characteristics of the participants are
presented in Table 1.
The inclusion criteria for participation in the study were as
follows: (1) native Italian speakers; (2) absence of severe cognitive
or linguistic deficits as assessed by not exceeding the cut-off
scores on the following neuropsychological tests: Mini-Mental
State Examination (MMSE; Folstein et al., 1975; cut-off: 24/30),
the Token Test, De Renzi and Vignolo, 1962; cut-off: 5/6), and the
denomination scale of the Aachener Aphasie test (AAT, Huber
et al., 1983; cut-off: no deficit); and (3) attainment of informed
consent. The patient symptomatology was assessed using the
Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS; Kay et al., 1987).
The exclusion criteria for both the experimental and
control groups were as follows: (1) evidence of current or
prior neurological disorders (e.g., epilepsy); (2) substance or
alcohol use disorder; (3) anamnesis of major neurological or
neuropsychological disease; (4) hearing or vision problems; and
(5) history of head injury.
Materials
Communicative-Pragmatic Assessment
We employed the linguistic and extralinguistic scales
of the Assessment Battery for Communication (ABaCo,
Angeleri et al., 2012, 2015).
Each scale of the battery evaluates the comprehension
and production of different communicative acts: sincere
communicative acts (direct and indirect), deceit and irony. In
each task, the examiner showed the participants a video-recorded
scene in which two semi-professional actors engage in a
TABLE 1 | Demographic and clinical data of the patients with schizophrenia and
healthy controls.
Variable Patients Controls
Demographic data Mean SD Mean SD
Age 40.17 10.77 40.28 11.16
Sex 10.59 2.46 10.50 2.46
Gender (M/F) 25/7 25/7
Cut-off test
MMSE 27.37 1.68
AAT 114.81 4.99
TOKEN 5.91 0.30
Clinical measures
PANSS total 45.64 19.02
PANSS positive 18.83 8.89
PANSS negative 20.28 9.65
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communicative exchange. In the linguistic scale, the actors in
the video communicated using language, and the participants
were required to reply verbally to the examiner. In the
extralinguistic scale, the actors in the video communicated using
performative gestures without any language support, and the
participants were required to reply using only communicative
gestures. The scale was organized into two subscales, i.e.,
comprehension and production subscales, which evaluated
the comprehension and production of communicative acts,
respectively. In the comprehension subscale, after the video
was presented, the participants were required to interpret
the final statement uttered by one actor in the video. In
the production subscale, after the video was presented, the
participants were required to produce a communicative act
in response to the final statement uttered by one actor in
the scene. Each subscale (linguistic comprehension, linguistic
production, extralinguistic comprehension, and extralinguistic
production) includes the following experimental tasks: four
sincere communicative acts, four deceitful communicative acts,
and four ironic communicative acts.
The utterances that were spoken in each scene of the battery
have been controlled for the number of words (7 ± 2) to
maintain constant memory and attention requirements. The
battery was administered individually to each participant and
video-recorded, and after administration, it was scored off-
line by two independent raters who were blinded to the
aims of the study. The psychometric validity of the battery
in terms of construct and content validity, as also reliability,
has been measured and tested with good results confirming
both the validity than the reliability of the tool. For additional
details, please see Sacco et al. (2008), Angeleri et al. (2012),
and Bosco et al. (2012). Additional details concerning the
administration and scoring procedures for the Assessment
Battery for Communication are provided in Parola et al. (2016)
and Bosco et al. (2017).
Regarding external validity, the battery has been designed
such that the items are as ecological as possible in adults.
The participants either deals with videorecorded communicative
interactions set in everyday contexts or interact with the
examiner in short exchanges/conversations. Even if we are
unable to provide direct experimental evidence supporting the
external validity of the instruments, a recent studies (Bosco
et al., 2018a; Parola et al., 2019a) support the convergent
validity of a battery with a different instruments measuring
functional communication, i.e., the Communication Activities
of Daily Living (Holland et al., 1999) and narratives tasks
(Marini et al., 2017).
Cognitive Functions and Theory of Mind Assessment
The individuals with schizophrenia and healthy controls
were administered a battery of cognitive and ToM tasks
to assess the cognitive functions most important for the
communicative-pragmatic ability. The following cognitive
functions were investigated:
Basic cognitive functions:
1. Attention: Attentive Matrices (Spinnler, 1987)
2. General intelligence: Raven’s Colored Progressive Matrices
(RCPM, Raven, 2003)
3. Processing speed: Trail Making test Part A (Reitan, 1958)
Executive functions:
1. Working memory: Disyllabic Word Repetition Test
(Spinnler, 1987), Corsi’s Block-Tapping Test (Orsini et al.,
1987), and Immediate Recall test (Spinnler, 1987)
2. Inhibitory control: Modified Card Sorting test
(Nelson, 1976)
3. Cognitive flexibility: Trail Making test Part B – Part A
(Reitan, 1958)
4. Planning: Tower of London (Shallice, 1982)
Theory of Mind:
1. First-order Theory of Mind: Smarties Task (Perner et al.,
1989), Sally & Ann Task (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985)
2. Advanced Theory of Mind: a selection of six Strange
Stories (Happé,, 1994), excluding stories evaluating
communicative aspects.
Data Analysis
The differences in the pragmatic performances between the
individuals with schizophrenia and the healthy controls on
the subscales of the ABaCo were examined by submitting the
scores obtained on the ABaCo to a 3x2 repeated-measures
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with pragmatic phenomena (three
levels: sincere, deceitful, and ironic communicative act) as the
within-subject factor and group (two levels: patients vs. controls)
as the between-subjects factor.
To investigate the significant differences between the cognitive
performances of the patients and controls, we performed a series
of independent-samples t-tests for each cognitive task examined,
i.e., general intelligence, selective attention, processing speed,
WM, inhibitory control, planning, cognitive flexibility and ToM.
To analyze the role of the cognitive factors and ToM in the
pragmatic performance of the individuals with schizophrenia,
we performed a hierarchical regression analysis. The relevant
predictors were included in the model in three consecutive steps
based on their increasing importance in determining pragmatic
performance. In particular, in the first stage, we entered basic
cognitive factors (general intelligence, selective attention, and
processing speed) considered necessary to solve any task. In the
second step, EF (WM, cognitive flexibility, inhibitory control
and planning) were entered as relevant predictors. In the third
and final step, we entered ToM. We conducted regression
analyses separately for each of the four subscales of the ABaCo
(linguistic comprehension, linguistic production, extralinguistic
comprehension, and extralinguistic production).
RESULTS
The independent-samples t-tests showed no significant
differences between the experimental and control
groups in age (t(62) = 0.042, p = 0.967) and education
(t(62) = 0.152, p = 0.879).
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Pragmatic Performance
The descriptive statistics of the performance of the patients
and controls in the tasks assessing the different pragmatic
phenomena, i.e., sincere communicative acts, deceit and irony,
evaluated by the ABaCo linguistic and extralinguistic scales are
reported in Table 2.
On the linguistic comprehension subscale, the ANOVA
revealed a significant main effect of group (F(1,62) = 18.824;
p < 0.001; η2p = 0.233), indicating that the group of individuals
with schizophrenia performed significantly worse than the
group of healthy controls on the linguistic comprehension
subscale. The main effect of the pragmatic phenomena was
also significant (F(2,124) = 5.131; p = 0.007; η2p = 0.076). The
linear contrast was significant and revealed a linear decrease
in performance depending on the type of communicative act
(F(2,62) = 7.450; p = 0.008; η2p = 0.107); the results indicated that
the sincere communicative acts were the easiest to understand,
followed by deceit and irony (see Table 2). The post hoc
pairwise comparisons revealed that there were no differences
between the patients and controls in the comprehension of
the linguistic sincere communicative acts (p = 0.32), while
significant differences were observed in the comprehension
of the deceitful (p < 0.001) and ironic communicative acts
(p = 0.004). See Figure 1.
On the linguistic production subscale, the ANOVA
showed a main effect of group (F(1,62) = 27.747; p < 0.001;
η2p = 0.309). The group of individuals with schizophrenia
performed significantly worse than the group of healthy
controls on the linguistic production subscale. The results
revealed a main effect of the pragmatic phenomenon
(F(2,124) = 31.261; p < 0.001; η2p = 0.335). The results showed
a significant linear decrease in performance depending on
the type of communicative act considered (F(2,62) = 42.818;
p < 0.001; η2p = 0.408); in particular, the production of sincere
communicative acts was easier than the production of deceit
and irony, which were the most difficult phenomenon to
produce (see Table 2). The post hoc pairwise comparisons
revealed that there were differences between the patients and
controls in the production of linguistic sincere (p = 0.048),
deceitful (p < 0.001) and ironic (p < 0.001) communicative
acts. See Figure 1.
On the extralinguistic comprehension subscale, the ANOVA
revealed a main effect of group (F(1,62) = 37.739; p < 0.001;
η2p = 0.378). The individuals with schizophrenia obtained
significantly lower scores than the healthy controls on the
extralinguistic comprehension subscale. We found a main
effect of the pragmatic phenomenon (F(2,124) = 21.714;
p < 0.001; η2p = 0.259). The linear contrast showed a linear
decrease in scores depending on the pragmatic phenomenon
(F(2,62) = 37.252; p < 0.001; η2p = 0.375); this analysis
indicated that the comprehension of sincere communicative
acts was easier than the comprehension of deceitful and ironic
communicative acts, which were the most difficult phenomenon
to understand (see Table 2). The post hoc pairwise comparisons
revealed that there were no differences between the patients
and controls in the comprehension of extralinguistic sincere
communicative acts (p = 0.08), while significant differences
were observed in the comprehension of the extralinguistic
deceitful (p < 0.001) and ironic (p < 0.001) communicative
acts. See Figure 2.
On the extralinguistic production subscale, the analysis
revealed a main effect of group (F(1,62) = 22.253; p < 0.001;
η2p = 0.264). Overall, the individuals with schizophrenia had
significantly lower scores than the healthy controls on the
extralinguistic production subscale. The results revealed a
main effect of pragmatic phenomenon (F(2,124) = 17.997;
p < 0.001; η2p = 0.225). The linear contrast was significant
and showed a linear decrease in performance based on the
communicative act considered (F(2,62) = 29.763; p < 0.001;
η2p = 0.324); the analysis indicated that the production of sincere
communicative acts was easier than the production of deceit
and irony (see Table 2). The post hoc pairwise comparisons
showed that there were differences between the patients and
controls in the production of extralinguistic sincere (p < 0.001),
TABLE 2 | Mean and standard deviation of the comprehension and production of standard, deceitful, and ironic communicative acts on the linguistic and
extralinguistic scales.
ABaCo scales Communicative acts Patients (n = 32) Controls (n = 32)
Mean SD Mean SD
Linguistic comprehension Standard 0.85 0.25 0.91 0.18
Deceit 0.66 0.29 0.90 0.12
Irony 0.68 0.29 0.86 0.18
Linguistic production Standard 0.87 0.21 0.95 0.12
Deceit 0.76 0.23 0.95 0.14
Irony 0.50 0.30 0.80 0.24
Extralinguistic comprehension Standard 0.82 0.24 0.91 0.16
Deceit 0.52 0.33 0.80 0.22
Irony 0.43 0.31 0.75 0.20
Extralinguistic production Standard 0.67 0.29 0.95 0.10
Deceit 0.68 0.28 0.83 0.21
Irony 0.45 0.36 0.71 0.29
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FIGURE 1 | Percentage of correct responses of individuals with schizophrenia and healthy controls in the comprehension and production of sincere, deceitful, and
ironic communicative acts on the linguistic scale of the ABaCo.
FIGURE 2 | Percentage of correct responses of individuals with schizophrenia and healthy controls in the comprehension and production of sincere, deceitful, and
ironic communicative acts on the extralinguistic scale of the ABaCo.
deceitful (p = 0.026), and ironic (p = 0.002) communicative
acts. See Figure 2.
Cognitive Functions and Theory of
Mind Assessment
The performances of the individuals with schizophrenia and
healthy controls in the different cognitive functions and ToM
tasks are reported in Table 3. The performance of the individuals
with schizophrenia was significantly worse than that of the
healthy controls in the following cognitive domains: attention,
general intelligence, processing speed, WM, inhibitory control,
planning, cognitive flexibility, and ToM (t-tests: 2.142 <
t(62) < 7.17;.0001 < p < 0.036).
Role of Cognitive Functions and ToM in
the Pragmatic Performance of Patients
With Schizophrenia and Healthy Controls
The contribution of attention, general intelligence and processing
speed—Model 1—in explaining pragmatic performance remains,
at best, modest and does not significantly increase the explained
variance. The inclusion of Model 2, i.e., EF (inhibitory control,
cognitive flexibility, WM, and planning), in the analysis did
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TABLE 3 | Mean and standard deviation of the cognitive and theory of mind tests.
Cognitive functions Test Patients Controls
Mean SD Mean SD t-Value Level of
significance
Basic cognitive ability Selective attention Attentive Matrices 36.80 8.98 49.07 5.80 −6.49 p < 0.001
Speed processing Trail Making test A 59.86 22.92 32.23 15.53 5.49 p < 0.001
General intelligence Raven Matrices 27.12 6.43 33.53 2.92 −4.09 p < 0.001
Executive functions Working memory Verbal Span 3.52 0.70 4.20 0.90 −3.37 p = 0.001
Visual Span 3.85 0.87 5.20 1.14 −5.29 p < 0.001
Immediate memory 41.12 22.08 56.22 17.30 −3.05 p = 0.003
Cognitive flexibility Trail Making test B-A 114.36 94.75 32.57 21.41 4.69 p < 0.001
Inhibition Nelson 59.53 35.29 88.60 19.34 −3.70 p < 0.001
Planning Tower of London 21.70 6.04 29.19 3.89 −5.91 p < 0.001
Theory of mind First order ToM Smarties 87.1 34.08 100.0 0.0 −2.14 p = 0.036
Sally & Ann 78.13 42.0 100.0 0.0 −2.95 p = 0.005
Second order ToM Strange Stories 65.33 22.46 95.78 8.54 −7.17 p < 0.001
not significantly increase the level of the explained variance
of the comprehension and production of any of the pragmatic
phenomena. The inclusion of Model 3, i.e., theory of mind,
significantly increased the explained variance only for the
linguistic comprehension of deceit (F(1,28) = 4.967; p = 0.034),
for the linguistic production of sincere communicative acts
(F(1,28) = 8.044; p = 0.008), and for the linguistic production of
deceit (F(1,28) = 4.801; p = 0.037) (see Table 4).
DISCUSSION
The aim of the present research was to investigate the role
that cognitive functions, such as general intelligence, selective
attention, processing speed, and especially EF (WM, cognitive
flexibility, inhibition, planning) and ToM, have in explaining
the ability of individuals with schizophrenia to comprehend
and produce communicative acts expressed with different
communicative intentions (sincere, deceitful, ironic) and realized
through both linguistic and extralinguistic expressive means.
First, we found that in all investigated tasks, the individuals
with schizophrenia performed worse than the controls, except
for the comprehension of linguistic and extralinguistic sincere
communicative acts, which were the easiest tasks analyzed. This
pattern of results in line with the relevant literature, confirming
that communicative-pragmatic difficulty is a core contributor
to the deficits exhibited by most patients with schizophrenia
(Langdon et al., 2002; Tavano et al., 2008; Colle et al., 2013;
Bambini et al., 2016; Cummings, 2017; Bucca, 2018; Parola et al.,
2018; Varga et al., 2018).
More specifically, in line with Colle et al. (2013), our results
revealed a decreasing trend in patient performance in managing
the different pragmatic tasks investigated, including sincere,
deceitful, and ironic communicative acts in both comprehension
and production on both the linguistic and extralinguistic scales
of the ABaCo (Angeleri et al., 2012). Other studies in the
literature have found the same trend of difficulty across different
populations, such as patients with left (Gabbatore et al., 2014)
and right (Parola et al., 2016) brain damage and traumatic brain
injury (Angeleri et al., 2008; Bosco et al., 2018a) and children
with typical (Bosco and Bucciarelli, 2008; Bosco et al., 2013) and
atypical development, i.e., autism spectrum disorder (Angeleri
et al., 2016), and these authors explained the changing difficulty
based on the increasing role of the inferential abilities required in
the different tasks.
The novelty of the present investigation was to explore the role
that different cognitive components have in explaining the ability
of patients with schizophrenia to comprehend and produce
different types of pragmatic tasks, i.e., sincere, deceitful, and
ironic communicative acts. Thus, we examined the performance
of patients with schizophrenia and controls in different cognitive
domains, i.e., general intelligence, selective attention, processing
speed, EF (WM, inhibitory control, planning, and cognitive
flexibility) and ToM. In line with the relevant literature (Frith,
1992; Brune, 2005; Harrington et al., 2005; Eisenberg and
Berman, 2010; Orellana and Slachevsky, 2013), we found that
the participants with schizophrenia had a significantly lower
performance than the healthy controls in each task investigated.
Then, we performed a multiple regression analysis to
investigate the predictive role of the cognitive factors in
explaining the patients’ pragmatic performance on each
specific pragmatic phenomenon, i.e., sincere, deceitful,
and ironic, on each of the four subscales of the ABaCo (i)
linguistic comprehension, (ii) production, (iii) extralinguistic
comprehension, and (iv) production. Specifically, we first
analyzed the role of basic cognitive factors (general intelligence,
selective attention, and processing speed) considered necessary
to solve any type of pragmatic tasks. Overall, the role of attention,
general intelligence and processing speed in explaining patients’
pragmatic performance was modest and did not appear to
significantly explain the patients’ communicative-pragmatic
performance. Then, we evaluated the role of EF (WM, cognitive
flexibility, planning and inhibitory control) as a relevant
predictor. EF can be considered a set of top–down cognitive
processes that enable people to control, regulate, and monitor
goal-directed behavior and other brain processes necessary to
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TABLE 4 | Hierarchical regression analysis of variables predicting the performance
of individuals with schizophrenia on the comprehension and production of sincere,
deceitful, and ironic communicative acts on both the linguistic and extralinguistic
scales: Model 1 (Attention, Speed processing, and General intelligence), Model 2
(WM, Planning, Cognitive flexibility and Inhibitory control), Model 3 (overall
Theory of Mind).
DVs IVs R2 R2Change FChange Sig. FChange
Linguistic comprehension
Standard Model 1 0.007 0.007 0.200 0.658
Model 2 0.040 0.034 1.023 0.320
Model 3 0.053 0.012 0.362 0.552
Deceit Model 1 0.007 0.007 0.204 0.655
Model 2 0.007 0.000 0.003 0.954
Model 3 0.157 0.150 4.967 0.034
Irony Model 1 0.010 0.010 0.315 0.579
Model 2 0.126 0.115 3.831 0.060
Model 3 0.132 0.006 0.184 0.671
Linguistic production
Standard Model 1 0.006 0.006 0.192 0.664
Model 2 0.076 0.070 2.197 0.149
Model 3 0.282 0.206 8.044 0.008
Deceit Model 1 0.016 0.016 0.484 0.492
Model 2 0.050 0.034 1.034 0.318
Model 3 0.189 0.139 4.801 0.037
Irony Model 1 0.003 0.003 0.101 0.753
Model 2 0.005 0.001 0.038 0.847
Model 3 0.045 0.040 1.171 0.288
Extralinguistic comprehension
Standard Model 1 0.102 0.102 3.418 0.074
Model 2 0.130 0.027 0.914 0.347
Model 3 0.130 0.000 0.009 0.925
Deceit Model 1 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.964
Model 2 0.009 0.009 0.257 0.616
Model 3 0.061 0.052 1.554 0.223
Irony Model 1 0.008 0.008 0.228 0.636
Model 2 0.065 0.058 1.796 0.191
Model 3 0.086 0.020 0.622 0.437
Extralinguistic production
Standard Model 1 0.036 0.036 1.110 0.300
Model 2 0.049 0.014 0.413 0.525
Model 3 0.107 0.057 1.798 0.191
Deceit Model 1 0.005 0.005 0.137 0.714
Model 2 0.020 0.015 0.444 0.510
Model 3 0.080 0.060 1.833 0.187
Irony Model 1 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.938
Model 2 0.022 0.022 0.639 0.431
Model 3 0.022 0.000 0.007 0.934
The table shows the adjusted regression coefficients (R2Adj) of each predictor
variable, the change in R2 after the addition of the planning and theory
of mind variables (R2Change), the change in F (FChange) and the significance
value (Sig FChange). The level of significance for all statistical tests is < 0.005.
effectively adapt to the environment and achieve goals (Miyake
et al., 2000; Diamond, 2013). We entered EF in the second step
of the regression analysis because we aimed to evaluate the
role of EF in pragmatic performance after controlling for the
influence of more basic cognitive functions in the first stage of
the model. The percentage of explained variance did not increase
significantly with the inclusion of EF, i.e., inhibitory control,
cognitive flexibility, WM and planning, in the comprehension
and production of any of the pragmatic phenomena investigated.
Finally, we evaluated whether ToM significantly explained
the pragmatic performance of patients after controlling for
the role of EF since some authors have proposed (Bloom and
German, 2000) and provided empirical evidence (Pickup, 2008;
McDonald et al., 2014; Honan et al., 2015) supporting the claim
that most ToM tasks require EF to be correctly solved. ToM
was the only factor able to significantly increase the explained
variance in the patients’ pragmatic performance but only in the
comprehension and production of deceit and production of
sincere communicative acts expressed with language. The role
of ToM in explaining the ability of patients with schizophrenia
in the comprehension of sincere linguistic communicative acts
could be explained by the presence of indirect speech acts, a
type of communicative act that is considered to require ToM
to be understood (Corcoran et al., 1995). It is noteworthy that
the comprehension of sincere communicative acts, which is
the simplest pragmatic task to solve for the participants with
schizophrenia, was explained by ToM ability, while the most
complex communicative act, i.e., irony, was not associated
with ToM. This result seems to suggest that the role played
by ToM in explaining patients’ pragmatic performance is not
associated with the inferential complexity of the pragmatic
phenomena considered.
The results showing the role of ToM in explaining the ability
to deal with deceit is in line with Peskin (1996), who was among
the first authors to discuss the importance of this cognitive
component in the ability to deal with deceitful speech acts. In
contrast, our results did not seem to support previous studies
suggesting a causal relationship exists between ToM and the
comprehension of verbal irony (Winner and Leekam, 1991). In
particular, our results do not support the hypothesis that ToM is
the cognitive component that best explains the greater difficulty
in comprehending irony compared to that in comprehending
deceit (Winner and Leekam, 1991). For similar results and
conclusions, see Bosco et al. (2012) and Bosco and Gabbatore
(2017a,b). The lack of a ToM causal role in explaining the ability
of patients with schizophrenia to process ironic communicative
acts also suggests that tasks based on irony comprehension
should be used with caution to measure patients’ mentalizing
ability (for a deeper discussion, please see Bosco et al., 2018c).
ToM is a complex and useful theoretical construct enhancing our
understanding of the symptomatology associated with diverse
clinical conditions, but ToM appears to be a cognitive domain
that does not completely overlap with the pragmatic domain
(Laghi et al., 2014; Bambini et al., 2016; Bosco et al., 2018c).
For example, as discussed by Bosco et al. (2018c) in greater
detail, (pragmatic) inferential ability does not always collapse
with the ability to understand others person’s mental states, i.e.,
ToM. An example is the case of conversational implicatures in
which a listener usually infers the speaker’s intended meaning
behind the literal one, i.e., what is literally proffered. For example,
scalar implicatures rely on quantifiers, such as “some,” “all,” etc.
For example, the interpretation of “On Sofia’s bed, some of the
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teddy bears are red” appears to imply that not all teddy bears are
red. In cases as the one mentioned above, no assumptions about
beliefs or other types of mental states appear to be required, thus
making the ability to comprehend implicatures based only on
inferential processes.
Notably, such processes might also involve ToM abilities.
This issue deserves further empirical investigation in order
to be clarified.
In summary, the novelty of the present study is the
investigation of the specific role played by specific cognitive
functions in explaining the ability of patients with schizophrenia
to comprehend and produce communicative acts with
different underlying intentions (sincere, deceitful, and
ironic) while simultaneously considering both linguistic and
extralinguistic/non-verbal expressive means. Our most original
result is that the linear increasing trend of difficulty detected
in the comprehension and production of sincere, deceitful, and
ironic communicative acts expressed through both language and
extralinguistic (non-verbal) expressive means seems to not be
explained by the increasing role of a specific set of cognitive
components (i.e., basic cognitive abilities + EF + ToM). In
line with previous investigations (Angeleri et al., 2008; Colle
et al., 2013), we suggest that the increasing trend of difficulty
among the tasks investigated, i.e., sincere, deceitful, and ironic
communicative acts, could be better explained by the increasing
inferential ability necessary to comprehend and produce each
task. In particular, our findings appear to not be in favor
of the role of ToM in explaining the increasing difficulty of
patients with schizophrenia in recognizing ironic communicative
acts compared to deceitful ones. Indeed, we found that ToM
was associated with the patients’ difficulty in producing and
comprehending deceit, but ToM was unable to explain the
patients’ increasing difficulty in managing irony compared to
deceit. Thus, we hypothesize that the inferential chain specifically
explains the increasing trend of difficulty detected, but further
empirical research is necessary to support this hypothesis. For
example, future studies could use specific tasks to provide a
direct measure of (pragmatic) inferential ability (e.g., scalar
implicature task) and then evaluate the presence of covariance
patterns between such a measure and different types of pragmatic
tasks, such as irony comprehension.
Our results seem to support a recent study showing that
impairments in pragmatics is a core and specific deficit of patients
with schizophrenia (Bambini et al., 2016). Specifically, the
authors administered the APACS test (Arcara and Bambini, 2016)
in addition to a set of cognitive and ToM tasks and measured
verbal memory, WM, verbal fluency, processing speed, and EF
(planning) and found that the pragmatic deficits do not overlap
with other cognitive deficits in more than 30% of the patients
investigated. These results indicate that pragmatic impairment
should not be merely reduced to the underlying cognitive
deficits and highlight the domain specificity of pragmatic ability.
This type of empirical evidence is particularly important given
Pawełczyk et al. (2018) proposal. The authors investigated the
presence of pragmatic impairment in patients with schizophrenia
and their healthy first-degree relatives and argued that pragmatic
dysfunction could be considered a vulnerability marker in
patients with schizophrenia and that its assessment could help
diagnosis during the early stage of the illness.
In summary, the results of our study suggest that in addition
to the domain usually considered in the clinical assessment of the
cognitive impairment of patients with schizophrenia, the role of
pragmatic and specifically the role of the (increasing) inferential
processes involved in a specific pragmatic phenomenon should
be considered to better comprehend the communicative difficulty
that characterizes such pathology.
Finally, despite the limitations, the present study has relevant
implications for the assessment of cognitive abilities in patients
with schizophrenia, highlighting the importance of considering
patients’ pragmatic symptoms as a distinct domain of assessment
with respect to other cognitive domains, such as EF and
ToM. This study may also provide useful suggestions for the
development of rehabilitative strategies aiming to help patients
recover and enhance their communicative performance since
recent studies have revealed a correlation between pragmatic
ability and communicative effectiveness in daily life (Bosco et al.,
2018b) and the perception of the quality of life (Bambini et al.,
2016). Indeed, in addition to other relevant interventions, the
ability to manage inferences should be considered in planning
therapeutic rehabilitative programs (see, for example, Gabbatore
et al., 2015; Bosco et al., 2016).
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